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ARGUMENT 
Wulff's Argument That Precedents Holding Implied Consent Is A Valid Exception 
To The Warrant Requirement Should Be Overruled Is Without Merit 
The district court erred when it reasoned that because there is no "bright 
line" exigency exception allowing warrantless blood draws there can be no 
implied consent. (Appellant's brief, pp. 3-5.) Wulff does not directly defend the 
district court's reasoning, but instead invokes the "unconditional conditions 
doctrine,,,1 asserting that consent may not be implied as a condition of driving on 
Idaho's roads or other public places. (Respondent's brief, pp. 5-13.) Wulff, 
however, has cited no authority that would prohibit implied consent under the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and review of that doctrine shows that it is 
inapplicable to implied consent as set forth in the Idaho Code. 
"Under the well-settled doctrine of 'unconstitutional conditions,' the 
government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right ... in 
exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government .... " Dolan v. 
City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994). 
For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even 
though a person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit 
and even though the government may deny him the benefit for any 
number of reasons, there are some reasons upon which the 
government may not rely. It may not deny a benefit to a person on 
a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected interests-
especially, his interest in freedom of speech. 
1 "Unconditional conditions" is an oxymoron. The correct name of this doctrine is 
the "unconstitutional conditions doctrine," which "vindicates the Constitution's 
enumerated rights by preventing the government from coercing people into 
giving them up." Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management Dist., _ U.S. 
_, 133 S.Ct. 25862594 (2013) (emphasis added). 
1 
Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972); see also Farnworth v. 
Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 285, 869 P.2d 1378, 1380 (1994). Thus, for example, 
the government does not have the "power to compel a private carrier to assume 
against his will the duties and burdens of a common carrier," which compulsion 
violates due process, as a "condition precedent to the enjoyment of a privilege" 
of a business license. Frost v. Railroad Comm'n of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 592-94 
(1926). Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Idaho Supreme 
Court has applied this doctrine to invalidate implied consent laws. To the 
contrary, both courts have specifically held that implied consent laws are valid. 
See, ~, North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983); State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 
300, 302-03, 160 P.3d 739, 741-42 (2007). Wulff makes two arguments for 
extending the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to invalidate implied consent, 
neither of which have merit. 2 
Wulff argues that other courts have applied the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine to reject implied consent. (Respondent's brief, pp. 8-13.) Review 
shows that this argument is, at best, overstated. In all of the cases cited the 
courts suppressed blood draws taken in an absence of probable cause to 
believe the driver was under the influence. State v. Quinn, 178 P.3d 1190 (Az. 
2 Despite his request that this Court overrule precedent, Wulff fails to cite the 
standard for doing so. Controlling precedent must be followed "unless it is 
manifestly wrong, unless it has proven over time to be unjust or unwise, or 
unle~~rl,Jlingit is necessary to vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and 
remedy continued injustice." State v. Dana, 137 Idaho 6, 9, 43 P.3d 765, 768 
(2002); State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 660, 8 P.3d 652, 655 (2000) 
(quoting Houghland Farms, Inc. v. Johnson, 119 Idaho 72, 77, 803 P.2d 978, 
983 (1990)). 
2 
App. 2008) (statute allowing blood draw because of involvement in serious 
accident struck down); Cooper v. State, 587 S.E.2d 605 (Ga. 2003) (same); 
Hannoy v. State, 789 N.E.2d 977 (Ind. App. 2003) (officers lacked probable 
cause to believe driver was under the influence). Wulff has cited to no case that 
has applied the unconstitutional conditions doctrine to strike down an implied 
consent statute such as Idaho's, which requires "reasonable grounds to believe" 
the driver was under the influence. I.C. § 18-8002(1 ).3 
Review of the cases cited does not demonstrate that implied consent, 
validated by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United 
States, is an "unconstitutional condition." Rather, the courts' holdings that the 
Constitution does not countenance implied consent in the absence of reason to 
believe that the driver is under the influence does not advance Wulff's argument 
because there was probable cause in this case to believe Wulff was driving 
under the influence of alcohol. (R., pp. 101-02.) At least one case from one of 
those jurisdictions, unrecognized by Wulff, says as much. See Hough v. State, 
620 S.E.2d 380, 383-84 (Ga. 2005) (distinguishing Cooper and holding that 
implied consent is constitutional where officers have probable cause to believe 
driver is under the influence). 
3 The necessity of particularized suspIcion is a primary difference between 
express consent and implied consent. Express consent can be given in the 
absence of any suspicion, while implied consent requires "reasonable grounds to 
believe." Properly understood, implied consent is merely an implied waiver of 
having a judge determine probable cause before, as opposed to after, the blood 
draw is performed, not a complete waiver of applicable Fourth Amendment 
rights. 
3 
Wulff also argues that implied consent "was not considered to afoul [sic] 
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine due to the fact that under pre-McNeely 
jurisprudence it was believed that an individual held no constitutional right to be 
free from warrantless blood draws." (Respondent's brief, p. 7 (citations 
omitted).) Wulff's assertion that the implied consent exception justified 
warrantless blood draws only because the exigency exception justified 
warrantless blood draws is both nonsensical and directly contrary to this Court's 
analysis in Diaz. "Because Diaz had already given his implied consent to 
evidentiary testing by driving on an Idaho road, he also gave his consent to a 
blood draw. Without addressing whether exigency also justified the blood draw, 
we hold that the seizure of Diaz's blood fell within a well-recognized exception to 
the warrant requirement." ill: at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. Thus, in Diaz, the blood 
draw was justified by the implied consent exception regardless of whether it was 
also justified by the exigency exception. The argument that implied consent 
justifies a warrantless blood draw only if exigent circumstances also justifies the 
warrantless blood draw is meritless. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has upheld implied consent as a valid 
exception to the warrant requirement. Diaz, 144 Idaho at 303, 160 P.3d at 742. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has also upheld implied consent 
statutes against constitutional attack. Illinois v. Batchelder, 463 U.S. 1112 
(1983); North Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983). In Missouri v. McNeely, 
_ U.S. _, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1565-66 (2013), the Court endorsed implied 
consent as a valid law enforcement tool. The district court erred when it 
4 
concluded that implied consent was not a valid exception to the warrant 
requirement. 
The district court erred by concluding that the Supreme Court of the 
United States, by declining to apply a bright line rule that exigent circumstances 
always justify a warrantless blood draw for BAC testing, eliminated implied 
consent as a viable exception to the warrant requirement. This holding is directly 
contrary to precedent of the Idaho Supreme Court and not justified by any 
precedent of the Supreme Court of the United States. The district court erred, 
and must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to reverse the district court's order granting 
suppression and remand for further proceedings. 
DATED this 21 st day of March, 20 3. 
KENNETH K. JOR~ENt.sEN 
Deputy Attorney General 
5 
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